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JURISDICTION 
The specific statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on 
the Utah Court of Appeals is found at § 78-2-(a) -3 (2) (N) of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No, 1; The Order on Order to Show Cause is 
unsupported by the facts and evidence before the Court. The 
standard is correction of error Carlton vs. Carlton. 84 UAR 21 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
Issue No. 2: The findings in the Order are inadequate to 
support the Order and are not supported by the facts before the 
Court. The standard of review is "an abuse of discretion" Carlton 
vs. Carlton, 84 UAR 21 (Utah App. 1988). 
Issue No. 3; Can the Court reject a stipulation for failure 
to comply with State Child Support Guidelines in 1989, and then in 
1992 adopt the same stipulation without any additional evidence. 
The standard is correction of error. Carlton, supra. 
Issue No. 4: Is the Court bound by stipulations of the 
parties when the Court has rejected the stipulation and dismissed 
the case in which the stipulation was submitted? Clawson vs. 
Clawson, 675 P.2d 562 (Utah 1983). Moonev vs. G.R. & Associates. 
1 
746 P.2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987). The standard is abuse of 
discretion. 
Issue No. 5: Can one party to an alleged stipulation seek to 
defeat the duty of the Trial Court? Pearson vs. Pearson, 561 P.2d 
1080 (Utah 1977); the standard is "abuse of discretion." 
Issue No. 6; Is a stipulation which is submitted to the Court 
and rejected by the Court, through the inaction of the parties, and 
in which one of the parties seeks to change the terms of the 
stipulation at the time it is submitted, a binding stipulation 
representing an agreement between the parties? This standard is 
abuse of discretion. Kline vs. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975). 
Issue No. 7: May the Court modify a binding decree from the 
State of Texas without finding that there has been a material 
change of circumstances? The standard is the Order must be 
supported by findings of fact. Gale vs. Gale, 258 P.2d 986 (Utah 
1953). 
Issue No. 8: Has there been a meeting of the minds and mutual 
assent where Appellee filed a letter with the Court seeking to 
change the terms of the stipulation at the time of the submittal 
of the stipulation? The standard is correction of error. John 
Call Engineering Inc., vs. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 
1987); Vassels vs. Lo Guidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987). 
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Issue No. 9: May the Court enforce a stipulation made 2 1/2 
years previously, and not agreed to between the parties? The 
standard is correction of error. Guardian State Bank vs. Stancrl, 
778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1988). 
Issue No* 10: May the Court enforce a stipulation rejected 
2 1/2 year previously, where the party seeking enforcement has 
breached the stipulation? The standard is correction of error. 
Issue No, 11: May the Court enforce a stipulation which it 
had rejected 2 1/2 years earlier and which due to an unforseen 
event, is rendered impossible or totally impractical? Standard is 
correction of error. Western Properties vs. Southern Utah Aviation, 
Inc.. 776 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The decision of this case depends upon the interpretation of 
§§ 78-45-7; 78-45-7.3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and 
Rules 4-403 and 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The parties obtained a Decree of Divorce in Texas on or about 
the 19th of September, 1986 (R. Pgs. 1-18: Addendum #1), which 
inter alia, required Defendant to pay $700.00 per month child 
support (R Pg. 15: Addendum #1, Pg. 4). The Defendant then moved 
to Virginia and the Plaintiff removed to Utah, then to Colorado. 
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While in Utah, Plaintiff brought Action #88-4400078 in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, to enforce child support payments from 
Defendant (R Pgs. 19-22: Addendum #2). In the said action, the 
parties were represented by their respective counsel. To settle 
the said case, the parties entered into a stipulation (R Pgs. 104-
108: Addendum #3). This Stipulation (together with an Order, R 
Pgs. 12 3-127) was submitted to the Court, Commissioner Howard H. 
Maetani presiding, on the 20th of November, 1989 (R Pg. 166, 
Paragraph 17, Addendum #11, Pg. 5, Paragraph 17). The Commissioner 
requested additional fiscal information from the parties prior to 
approving the Stipulation and signing the Order, based upon his 
interpretation of the child support agreed to between the parties 
being in compliance with the then existing Child Support Guidelines 
of the State (R Pg. 165, Paragraph 19; R Pg. 166, Paragraph 18: 
Addendum #11, Pg. 5 Paragraph 18) . Neither party provided the 
requested information (R Pg. 165, Paragraph 19; R Pg. 193, 
Paragraph 7: Addendum #11, Pg. 6, Paragraph 20). The Commissioner 
rejected the Stipulation and refused to sign the Order on January 
8, 1990, and mailed both the Stipulation and the Order back to 
Defendant's attorney, Graham Dodd (R 165 Paragraph 20; R Pg. 87: 
Addendum #6). On March 18, 1991, the Court issued its own Order 
to Show Cause (R, Pg. 88) why the case should not be dismissed and 
when neither Plaintiff nor Defendant appeared, the Commissioner 
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formally dismissed the case without prejudice on April 15, 1991 for 
failure to prosecute (R Pg. 96: Addendum #7). By February 5, 1992, 
both of the parties had moved back to Utah and the Defendant, being 
unemployed, petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No. 
92-4400164, pro se, inter alia for a modification of the Texas 
Divorce Decree, with respect to child support payments based upon 
his material change of circumstances, i.e., he had no income. This 
case was consolidated with the Plaintiff's action (R Pg. 199: 
Addendum #8) . For her part, Plaintiff brought an Order to Show 
Cause why Defendant should not be held in contempt for failure to 
pay child support and to increase the child support in Case No. CV 
88-4400078. The parties appeared before Commissioner Maetani on 
the Order to Show Cause on the 17th of March, 1992 (R Pg. 100: 
Addendum #9) . Defendant appeared pro-se and Plaintiff with her 
counsel. At the said hearing, Plaintiff urged that the Court adopt 
the old Stipulation formerly rejected by the Court and enter an 
Order incorporating the Stipulation despite the fact that the 
Defendant reminded the Court that the Stipulation had been rejected 
by the Court for improper documentation two and one-half years 
previously, and the same Commissioner had dismissed the case for 
failure on the part of the parties to prosecute (See transcript of 
hearing R Pgs. 489-504: Addendum #10). But the Commissioner ruled 
that because Defendant's attorney had failed to file the 
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Stipulation, he could not penalize Plaintiff and would enforce the 
Stipulation nunc-pro-tunc (R Pg. 491) . But the Commissioner gave 
Defendant 10 days to provide documentation and any other reason why 
it should not be adopted. On March 25, 1992, Defendant filed his 
documents with the Court which comprised an Affidavit of Graham 
Dodd with supporting documents (R Pgs. 121-170: Addendum #11), an 
Affidavit of Norman Rowe with supporting documents (R Pgs. 171-
195 Addendum #12) and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R Pgs 
113-120). Notwithstanding the filing of these documents, the 
Commissioner's signature was stamped on the Order on Order to Show 
Cause on March 30, 1992. 
In his Order on Order to Show Cause, Commissioner Maetani 
consolidated the case that he had previously dismissed (#88-
4400078) and in which he had rejected the Stipulation based upon 
the parties1 failure to respond to the Court's request for 
additional information (R Pg. 198, Paragraph 1: Addendum #13), with 
Case #92-4400164. Further the Order states that the Commissioner 
ruled the way he did because the Stipulation entered into by and 
between the parties on September 10, 1989, was prepared by Norman 
Rowe• s attorney but was never filed with the Court (R. Pg. 298, 
Paragraph 2: Addendum #13). The documents submitted to the Court 
on March 25, 1991 clearly show that the Stipulation was filed with 
the Court by Norman Rowe's attorney, but were rejected and mailed 
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back (R Pg. 87, Letter of Court Clerk: Addendum #5). There was no 
good cause shown as to why the dismissal of the case based on the 
parties' joint refusal to supply the information requested by the 
Court and Plaintiff's failure to prosecute should be set aside, and 
why the case should be reopened and the Stipulation enforced, 
especially in light of the Defendant's objection to it. (See 
transcript of hearing R Pgs. 489-504: Addendum #10.) In addition, 
no explanation of why if the Stipulation did not comply with the 
law on September 10, 1989, it could suddenly comply on March 17, 
1992. The Defendant objected to the Order on Order to Show Cause 
(R Pgs. 210-306). Judge Cullen Y. Christensen overruled the 
objection on the 4th of June, 1992, without making any findings (R 
Pg. 398: Addendum #14). Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on 
July 6, 1992 (R Pgs. 449-450: Addendum #15) in which he appealed 
the Order of Commissioner Maetani and the ruling of Judge 
Christensen as they pertain to Case No. 88-4400078. Since 
Defendant was proceeding pro se on Case #92-44000164 to obtain 
modification of the child support payments as found in the Texas 
decree, Defendant moved for a motion to extend time on the appeal 
until Case No. 924400164 could be resolved at the Trial Court 
level. This motion was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals on 
October 13, 1992. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A stipulation of the parties is never binding upon a Trial 
Court and neither party to the stipulation can direct the authority 
of the Court nor seek to have the Trial Court avoid its duty of 
modifying a divorce decree due to changed circumstances. In 
addition, the parties effectively waived the Stipulation by not 
providing the Trial Court with satisfactory fiscal information to 
comply with the Child Support Guidelines of the State. In 
addition, the parties, although both signed the Stipulation, never 
had a meeting of the minds as to its contents and each signed 
believing the document stated something different; constituting a 
mutual mistake. The Trial Court rejected the Stipulation and Order 
and dismissed the suit under which it was filed. The Court may not 
now reinstate the Stipulation of the parties without the consent 
of the parties without showing good cause, and the Trial Court's 
order must reflect the facts before it. The enquiry of the Court 
should not have been the enforcement of the Stipulation; but the 
change in material circumstances of the parties. The Trial Court 
is obligated to follow statutory requirements and follow the Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Stipulation of the Parties Not Binding on the Court, 
The Stipulation heretofore submitted by the parties is not binding 
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upon the Court, and the Trial Court has complete discretion to set 
it aside if it so chooses. See Kline vs. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 
1975); and as the Utah Supreme Court said in Clawson vs. Clawson, 
675 P.2d 562 (Utah 1983), "Stipulations of the parties to an action 
are only advisory to the Court and the Court is not bound by them." 
In addition, the Supreme Court has said: 
If there is any justification in law or equity for 
avoiding or repudiating a stipulation and he timely does 
so, he is entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise not. 
Kline, at Page 476. 
Further, in a 1987 Utah Court of Appeals case, while acknowledging 
under certain conditions that courts can be bound by stipulations 
between the parties, the Court indicated "that they are not bound 
when points of law requiring judicial determination are involved." 
Mooney vs. G.R. and Associates, 746 P.2d 1174. (Ut. Ct. of App. 
1987) 
In the instant case, the Stipulation was submitted to the 
Court, together with a proposed Order (R Pg. 166, Paragraph 17: 
Addendum #11, Paragraph 17). However, the Court feeling that the 
Stipulation did not meet the requirements of the Child Support 
Guidelines Statutes of the State, requested further documentation 
from both parties (R Pg. 116, Paragraph 18: Addendum #11, Paragraph 
18) . 
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II. Statutory Requirement. The applicable statutes and their 
pertinent language are as follows: 
§ 78-45-7.3(3)(a). 
In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving 
parties shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by Subsection 
78-45-7.5(5); and 
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not 
the amount of child support requested is consistent with 
the guidelines. 
The record in this case is devoid of any child support 
worksheets, financial verification or written statements indicating 
that the child support in the Stipulation was consistent with the 
Guidelines. Clearly, in signing the Order the Trial Court violated 
this statute. Further, the Court failed to follow Rule 4-504 of 
the Code of Judicial Administration. In subparagraph (8) of that 
Rule it states: 
No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon 
stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the 
stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the 
clerk or the stipulation was made on the record. 
A careful review of the record indicates that the Stipulation 
was neither signed by respective counsel, nor read into the record. 
Thus, by adopting it, the Court violated this rule, and renders its 
Order unenforceable. 
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In 1989, when the documentation was not forthcoming, the Court 
quite correctly rejected both the Stipulation and the proposed 
Order, and both documents were returned by the Court through its 
Clerk to the Defendant's attorney, who had mailed them to the Court 
(R Pg. 165, Paragraph 20; R Pg. 87: Addendum #5). 
Further, based upon the failure of either party to provide 
the necessary documentation, the Court on its own motion, dismissed 
the case on April 15, 1991 (R Pg. 96: Addendum #7). But Defendant 
submits that once having following the statute in 1989, it could 
not arbitrarily violate it in 1992 without additional facts to 
bring the Stipulation within the purview of the statute. 
In the second hearing, on the same case on March 17, 1992, 
that hearing was clearly governed by § 78-45-7 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, which states in its applicable parts: 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount 
granted by prior court order unless there has been a 
material change of circumstances on the part of the 
obligor or obligee. 
What the Court had before it was a joint request for modification 
of the Texas Decree based upon changed circumstances. Instead of 
investigating the parties alleged changes in their circumstances, 
as required by statute, the Court committed error by adopting a 
stipulation which did not meet the requirements of § 78-45-
7.3(3) (a) when it was submitted in 1989, and still did not when it 
was resubmitted in 1992. There is no evidence in the record to 
11 
show compliance with either § 78-45-7.3(3)(a) or § 78-45-7 and 
therefore Defendant submits because the parties were given the 
opportunity to render the Stipulation enforceable by providing the 
necessary documentation to bring it into compliance with statute, 
but failed to do so on two separate occasions, that it cannot and 
should not be enforced. 
III. Findings of the Order Not Supported by Facts: 
(a) In Paragraph 2 of the Order, it states that the 
parties entered into a Stipulation on September 10, 1989, 
prepared by Norman Rowe's attorney, and that the Stipulation 
was never filed by his attorney. This statement in the Order 
is manifestly incorrect since the documents and Affidavits 
filed with the Court on March 25, 1992, clearly indicate that 
the Stipulation was filed with the Court, and was rejected. 
(See Affidavit of Graham Dodd and accompanying documents from 
the Clerk of the Court returning the Stipulation and Order, 
Addendum #fs 5 and 11) . That the Court committed error, there 
can be no doubt; for in the transcript of the hearing held on 
March 17, 1991, the Commissioner concluded in ten (10) 
different places that the Stipulation was never filed. (R 
Pgs. 492, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 501, and 502: Addendum #10) 
This could have been avoided had he read the file before him 
and his own clerk»s letter (R Pg. 87: Addendum #5). 
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(b) The above Affidavit and accompanying documents, 
together with the Affidavit of Norman Rowe (R Pg. 193-195: 
Addendum #12), clearly indicate that the Court rejected the 
Stipulation based on the parties' joint failure to supply 
additional information to the Court (R Pgs. 113-195), thus 
rendering the Stipulation not in compliance with the Child 
Support Guidelines of the State, as enumerated above, which 
required fiscal disclosure by the parties. The record does 
not show any additional disclosure to the Court on or before 
March 17, which would render the Stipulation in compliance 
with the Guidelines. If it was rejected by the Trial Court 
in 1989 due to failure to comply with statute, then it should 
also have been rejected in 1992. 
(c) Further, Paragraph 2 states that the parties in 
reliance on the Stipulation, executed a Satisfaction of 
Judgment and Mr. Rowe paid to Mrs. Rowe the sum of $12,600.00. 
The Affidavits before the Court, indicate that the $12,600.00 
was paid to satisfy back child support ($1,600.00) and 
$11,000.00 to satisfy an administrative default judgment 
obtained by the State of Utah for and in behalf of Mrs. Rowe. 
Mrs. Rowe accepted the offer of the money and in exchange 
thereof executed the Satisfaction. Therefore, Mrs. Rowe 
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received full consideration for executing the Satisfaction of 
Judgment. 
(d) The Affidavits before the Court indicate that 
Mrs. Rowe, at the last minute in a written letter to the 
Court, attempted to change the terms and conditions of 
the Stipulation (R Pg. 103). This, together with the 
failure of the parties to supply the information to the 
Court as requested by the Court, indicates their 
unwillingness to abide by the Stipulation at the time 
when it was submitted by Graham Dodd, Mr. Norman Rowe's 
attorney. In addition, Mr. Rowe's letter of September 
10, 1990 (R Pg. 191: Addendum #12) together with his 
Affidavit (R Pg. 194, Paragraph 6: Addendum #12) clearly 
indicates his belief that since the Court had rejected 
the Stipulation, it was null and void. Thereby clearly 
voiding the Court's finding in its Order that the parties 
relied on the Stipulation. (See Paragraph 2 of Order on 
Order to Show Cause (R Pgs. 297-298: Addendum #13.) 
IV. Plaintiff Cannot Direct the Authority of the Court. The 
Plaintiff is now attempting to enforce a stipulation which was 
submitted to the Court, refused by the Court, and the case 
dismissed, based upon failure to comply with statutes and failure 
to prosecute. Our Supreme Court has held that the parties to an 
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action may not seek to defeat the authority or duty of the Trial 
Court through a stipulation. Pearson vs, Pearson, 561 P.2d (Utah 
1977). Defendant submits that this Court is not bound by the 
alleged Stipulation filed with the parties1 signatures on it, and 
this has been the law in the State of Utah for many years. See 
Johnson vs. Johnson, 439 P.2d 843, 21 Utah 2d 23 (1968), where the 
Supreme Court held: 
Trial Court does not have to pay any attention 
to written stipulation of the parties inter se 
when making division of property in divorce 
actions. 
Since the Court is not bound by the Stipulation, and once 
having correctly rejected it, must disclose some compelling reason 
to adopt it and to cure its statutory defects, which it has failed 
to do, must follow that its Order is void. The facts, the 
statutes, the rules and the law are manifestly contrary to the 
action taken by the Trial Court. 
V. Parties Effectively Waive Stipulation Through Non-Action 
and Plaintiff is Now Estopped From Asserting It. The parties were 
advised that the Court had rejected the Stipulation and the Order, 
subject to the parties providing additional information to the 
Court (R Pg. 165, Paragraph 19: Addendum #11; R Pg.193, Paragraph 
7: Addendum #12, see letter of Defendant to Plaintiff (R Pg. 191: 
Addendum #12). Neither party acted upon the request of the Court 
and it was not until the Defendant became unemployed and ceased to 
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make child support payments that the Plaintiff brought her Order 
to Show Cause, invoking the non-complying Stipulation on a case 
which had effectively been dismissed 2 1/2 years previously for 
sound statutory reasons. The inaction of the Plaintiff between 
1989 when the Stipulation was rejected and February of 1992 when 
she tried to enforce it, is just too long a period of time to 
remain inactive. Defendant has submitted a record of child support 
payments through December of 1991 (R Pgs. 189-173: Addendum #12). 
If calculated correctly, those show payments of almost $700.00 per 
month, in compliance with the Texas Decree and Plaintiff's apparent 
acceptance of the lesser amount. Defendant reminded Plaintiff that 
he was only paying the amount ordered by the Texas Decree and that 
the Stipulation had been rejected (R Pgs. 190-191: Addendum #12). 
Therefore, it was an error of the Court to enforce the Stipulation 
nunc-pro-tunc and fail to consider the current circumstances of the 
parties and past payments. Defendants submits that even if the 
Stipulation had been enforceable in 1989, the child support was 
still subject to review due to material change of circumstances per 
§ 78-45-7 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The parties had 
effectively waived their rights to enforce the Stipulation by 
inaction. The Supreme Count has said that, "A waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.11 Plateau Mining Co. 
vs. Utah Division of Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 770 (Utah 1990). 
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Plaintiff had a known right to enforce the Stipulation in 1989, 
when it was before the Court, but when she refused to act, after 
notice, she waived that right. The Supreme Court in Beckstead vs. 
Deseret Roofing Company, Inc.. 831 P.2d 130 (Utah 1992) said: 
Failure to adhere to precise terms of the contract, 
combined with the absence of notice of a party's 
intention to insist on strict compliance, is enough 
evidence to support a finding of waiver (at Page 133). 
By not insisting on the adoption of the Stipulation, by not 
providing the documentation requested by the Court, and by 
accepting the $700.00 per month as per the Texas Decree, and by 
doing nothing after notice, the Plaintiff waived enforcement of the 
Stipulation. Even at the second hearing, the Plaintiff failed to 
bring the Stipulation within the statutes and Rule as above cited. 
Plaintiff is now estopped from enforcing the Stipulation, 
according to CECO vs. Concrete Specialists, Inc.. 772 P.2d 967 
(Utah 1989). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court said, estoppel 
requires proof of three elements: (1) . . . failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable 
action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on basis 
of first party's failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second 
party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict 
or repudiate such . . . failure to act (at Page 969) . By not 
acting to enforce the Stipulation and by accepting the lesser child 
support payments as per the Texas Decree and by not responding to 
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Defendant's letters, Plaintiff is now estopped from enforcing the 
Stipulation. Mr. Rowe's letter of September 10, 1990 clearly 
states that he advised Mrs. Rowe of his belief as follows: inter 
alia, In January of 1990, he stopped sending $300.00 per child for 
the children because the Judge had refused to sign the Order 
submitted with the Stipulation. He further stated, "You must be 
aware-by now-that the only monies required of me, is the $700.00 
ordered in the Texas Decree . . ." (R Pg. 191: Addendum #12). 
It was not until May 4, 1992 that the Court obtained financial 
statements from Defendant (R 3 65) which showed be had no income, 
no assets and expenses of $540.00 per month. This should have been 
the thrust of the Court's inquiry on March 17, 1992 at its Order 
to Show Cause hearing, not the enforcement of the invalid and 
statutorily unacceptable Stipulation. 
VI. Stipulation Does Not Represent a Meeting of the Minds 
Between the Parties. Based upon the Plaintiff's letter to the 
Court (R Pg. 103: Addendum #3), the Plaintiff did not understand 
the terms and conditions of the Stipulation, although she signed 
it. In her letter to the Court, the Plaintiff indicates that the 
Defendant had agreed to pay all court costs and recording fees. 
Mr. Rowe indicates that he did not agree to those arrangements; but 
Plaintiff's letter indicates she thought he had; thus changing the 
intent of the Stipulation to include Mr. Rowe paying attorney fees 
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and court costs (R Pg. 194, Paragraph 5: Addendum #12). The 
Stipulation itself does not mention recording fees but indicates 
that the court costs and attorneys1 fees would be the 
responsibility of each respective party (R Pg. 105, Paragraph 9: 
Addendum #3). The Defendant's Affidavit indicates his belief was 
that each party would be responsible for their own attorney's fees 
and he never at any time agreed to be responsible for and pay all 
attorneys' fees and costs (R Pgs. 192-195: Addendum #12). 
Therefore, the actions of the Plaintiff indicate that there was 
never any full meeting of the minds even though she signed the 
Stipulation. In Mooney vs. G. P. & Associates. 746 P.2d 1174, at 
page 1178, this Court stated,"It is well settled that a contract 
is voidable if there is a mutual mistake of material fact." 
Further, the Defendant, upon receipt of a copy of the Plaintiff's 
letter to the Court, realized that there was no agreement between 
the parties and therefore the Stipulation, even though signed, did 
not really represent a meeting of the minds as between the parties, 
and since the Court had indicated that it was not going to approve 
the Stipulation and sign the Order, that the Stipulation was of no 
force and effect (See Defendant's letter to Plaintiff R Pg. 191: 
Addendum #12). It is clear from the documents before the Court 
that the Defendant believed that the Stipulation was not binding. 
In his correspondence to the Plaintiff of September 10, 1990, he 
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clearly states that he is only bound by the Texas Decree (R Pg. 
191: Addendum #16). Therefore, to grant Plaintiff's motion would 
be to enforce a stipulation that was once correctly rejected by the 
Court upon which the parties never really had a meeting of the 
minds, in a case that has already been dismissed due to lack of 
prosecution and noncompliance with statute. In addition, since 
both parties had brought actions to modify the Texas Decree, Mr. 
Rowe, based upon his drastic and material change in circumstances, 
and Mrs. Rowe based upon his failure to pay and her increased 
expenses, the question of material change of circumstances was 
plainly before the Court. The Court's proper direction should have 
been the investigation of the changed circumstances, which it 
failed to do. 
VII. Improper Execution. Defendant submits that the Trial 
Court committed one last error in its determination of this case. 
The Order on Order to Show Cause (R Pg. 296: Addendum #13) has not 
been properly signed by the Court. The stamped reproduction of the 
Commissioner's signature does not validate the Order. The 
Defendant in this action knows of no rule or statute which would 
allow the clerk to stamp the signature of the Commissioner on an 
order to make it valid. The closest rule we have found is in the 
Judicial Code. The applicable Rule is found at 4-403 of the Code 
of Judicial Administration, which states in its pertinent parts: 
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(1) The clerk of the court may, upon prior judicial 
approval, use a "Signature Stamp" in lieu of 
obtaining the judge's signature on the following: 
(d) Orders to Show Cause 
(2) When a clerk is authorized to use a signature 
stamped as provided in paragraph (a) , the clerk 
shall sign his or her name on the order or minute 
entry directly beneath the stamped imprint of the 
judge's name. 
(3) All other orders shall be personally signed by the 
judge. 
Even if the Order on Order to Show Cause meets this Rule, which 
Defendant does not admit, it is clear that whoever stamped the 
Order should not have done so without signing the same in 
compliance with the above Rule. A quick review of the Order on 
Order to Show Cause (R Pg. 296: Addendum #13) shows that this was 
not done. By not complying with this rule, Defendant submits that 
the Order on Order to Show Cause is invalid and should not be 
upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time when the parties submitted the Stipulation and 
Order to the above entitled Court, neither one was living within 
the State. The Stipulation was negotiated between them, and their 
respective counsel, and was submitted to the Court, together with 
an Order, for the Commissioner's signature. However, the Court 
rejected the Order and the Stipulation and requested additional 
information to comply with the Utah Statutes regulating Child 
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Support Guidelines. When the parties failed to come forth with the 
requested documentation, the Court correctly on its own motion, 
dismissed the case. The dismissal of the case rendered the 
Stipulation null and void. In addition, the letter from the 
Plaintiff indicating a different understanding of the Stipulation 
from that expressed in the Stipulation, indicates that she did not 
fully understand the Stipulation and that a meeting of the minds 
had not occurred. In addition, the inaction of the Plaintiff after 
notice and her acceptance of the Texas Decree child support amount 
constitutes waiver and estoppel. Further, the Court below erred 
in not bringing the Stipulation within the requirements of the 
Child Support Statutes and not directing its inquiry into the 
material change of circumstances alleged by the parties. The Court 
failed to comply with §§ 78-45-7, 78-45-7.3; Rule 4-504 and Rule 
4-403. Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the case 
be remanded back to the Fourth Judicial District Court for further 
proceedings and that the Order on Order to Show Cause be stricken 
and the Stipulation of September 10, 1989 be declared null and 
void. 
DATED on this the dJo*~ <*aY of February, 1993. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of February, 1993, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NORMAN H. ROWE first class postage prepaid to the following: 
Ginger E. Rowe, Pro Se 
5936 West 10550 North 
Highland, Utah 84004 
Ginger E. Rowe, Pro Se 
226 North 100 West 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Marilyn Moody Brown 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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